

In the  
**Supreme Court of Ohio**

|                                        |   |                                 |
|----------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------|
| SHAWNEE RIDGE HUNTING,<br>LLC, et al., | : | Case No. _____                  |
|                                        | : |                                 |
| Plaintiffs-Appellees,                  | : | On appeal from the Adams County |
|                                        | : | Court of Appeals,               |
|                                        | : | Fourth Appellate District       |
| v.                                     | : |                                 |
|                                        | : | Court of Appeals                |
| STATE OF OHIO, et al.,                 | : | Case No. 25CA1215               |
|                                        | : |                                 |
| Defendants-Appellants.                 | : |                                 |

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**MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JURISDICTION  
OF STATE APPELLANTS**

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## INTRODUCTION

Wild boar and feral swine are considered nuisance animals because they pose a threat to Ohio farmers, hunters, and the State’s environment more generally. That is why the General Assembly has prohibited the keeping and feeding of such animals. *See* R.C. 1533.75. It is also why the General Assembly prohibited the knowing release of feral swine in any hunting preserve in Ohio. R.C. 1533.731(A)(4) (together with related statutes, the “feral-swine laws”).

The Fourth District Court of Appeals permanently enjoined the enforcement of the feral-swine laws on the basis that they are facially unconstitutional. *See Shawnee Ridge Hunting, LLC v. LaRose, et al.*, 2026-Ohio-995 (“App.Op.”). Its decision to do so presents a substantial constitutional question that is of public and great general interest. As the Court recently recognized, the State has “a sovereign interest in passing and enforcing [its] duly enacted laws, and a court’s order enjoining the operation of such laws causes irreparable injury to that sovereign interest.” *Doe v. Columbus*, 2026-Ohio-1095, ¶2. Whether the State may be forced to suffer such an injury is alone a substantial question that warrants this Court’s review.

The Fourth District’s *reasons* for enjoining the feral-swine laws confirm the need for review. The lower court offered two independent reasons for enjoining the laws: it held that the laws constitute an uncompensated taking and that the laws are unconstitutionally vague. If allowed to stand, the Fourth District’s holdings will cause mischief throughout the State. Both reasons already conflict with decisions from this Court, as well as other courts in Ohio. If the Court does not correct the Fourth District

now, it will be forced to do so later. It is only a matter of time before an appellate court creates a new, additional, conflict by *correctly* applying Ohio constitutional law.

## STATEMENT

### **I. The General Assembly prohibited keeping or releasing feral swine.**

Feral swine are widely considered to be “a dangerous and destructive invasive species.” United States Department of Agriculture, *Feral Swine: Managing an Invasive Species*, available at <https://perma.cc/2ZNU-YFZ7>. In 2019 alone, feral swine in the United States caused approximately \$1.5 billion dollars’ worth of damage to crops. Congressional Sportsman Foundation, *Resources for Managing Feral Swine*, available at <https://perma.cc/ML6W-USDH>.

In Ohio, reports of damage caused by feral swine dramatically increased in the years following 2007. Brian Plasters, et al., *Feral Swine in Ohio: Managing Damage and Conflicts*, Ohio State University Extension (Nov. 20, 2013), available at <https://perma.cc/L37L-MFER>. And there is no sign that Ohio’s feral swine population is decreasing. Just the opposite. All indications are that the “ranges of some local feral swine populations are expanding due to purposeful and illegal transportation and release of feral swine for hunting purposes.” *Id.*

Numerous states have taken steps to control or eliminate feral swine by, among other things, prohibiting the possession, transportation or release of feral swine. *See Resources for Managing Feral Swine*, available at <https://perma.cc/ML6W-USDH> (collecting state statutes). “Currently, 44 states ban the importation of feral swine and 16 states ban the hunting and importation of feral swine.” App.Op.¶29. Ohio joined their ranks in 2025. The General Assembly unanimously adopted H.B. 503,

which imposed restrictions on federal swine that took effect on March 20, 2025. *See* House Bill 503 Status, Ohio General Assembly, available at <https://perma.cc/PS9T-6UK6>. The Ohio Farm Bureau, Ohio Pork Council, Ohio Soybean Association, and Ohio Corn & Wheat Growers Association, among others, all supported the proposed feral-swine laws. *See* House Bill 503 Committee Activity, Ohio General Assembly, available at <https://perma.cc/6XRS-6QD3>.

Among other things, the feral-swine laws prohibit the release of feral swine for hunting in any hunting preserve, R.C. 1533.731(B)(4), and they preclude anyone from profiting from the hunting of feral swine, R.C. 1533.75(A)(5). Consistent with those prohibitions, Ohio’s feral-swine laws permit a person to eradicate feral swine on his property without a hunting license. R.C. 1533.751(B). But they otherwise prohibit “hunting, trapping, or killing” feral swine. R.C. 1533.75(A)(4). Finally, the laws include other restrictions to combat the spread of feral swine. These restrictions include a prohibition on the “[i]mport, transport, or possess[ion]” of feral swine, a prohibition on expanding the range of feral swine, and a prohibition on allowing a swine under a person’s control to live in a feral state. R.C. 1533.75(A)(1)–(3).

## **II. The Adams County Court of Common Pleas facially enjoined the feral-swine laws and the Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed.**

Shortly before H.B. 503’s effective date, Shawnee Ridge Hunting, LLC, and its owner, Paul Richter, (together “Shawnee Ridge”) filed a lawsuit in Adams County in which they sought “declaratory relief, as well as injunctive relief, prohibiting H.B. 503 from taking effect.” March 18, 2025 Complaint at ¶3. The complaint named as defendants the “State of Ohio” in care of the Ohio Secretary of State, the Director of

the Ohio Department of Natural Resources, the Director of the Ohio Department of Agriculture, and the Ohio Attorney General (collectively “the State”). In relevant part, Shawnee Ridge alleged that the new law infringed on its “fundamental right to property” and asserted that “H.B. 503 does not survive strict scrutiny.” *Id.* at ¶¶54, 56 (emphasis omitted). Shawnee Ridge further alleged that “H.B. 503 is also unconstitutionally vague.” *Id.* at ¶58. (Shawnee Ridge also challenged the new law’s definition of feral swine. *See id.* at ¶¶24–25, 47. The General Assembly has since amended that definition, mooted that portion of Shawnee Ridge’s complaint. *See App.Op.*¶112.)

The trial court agreed with Shawnee Ridge. It eventually granted Shawnee Ridge permanent relief, after holding a hearing that it converted to a permanent injunction hearing over the State’s objections. *App.Op.*¶¶11, 51. The trial court issued a state-wide injunction in which it held that H.B. 503 was facially unconstitutional. It held that the feral-swine laws reflected in H.B. 503 were “void for vagueness, and therefore violate[d] [Shawnee Ridge’s] rights to due process.” *See App.Op.*¶94. In the alternative, it held that the feral-swine laws were unconstitutional because they “would constitute an unjust and uncompensated taking.” *App.Op.*¶95.

The State appealed and the Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision enjoining the feral-swine laws on a facial, state-wide basis. *App.Op.*¶112. It held that “H.B. 503” was an unconstitutional taking because it requires “the immediate loss of property and provides no system for compensation.” *App.Op.*¶108. And it held that “H.B. 503 violated Due Process because it was

unconstitutionally vague.” App.Op.¶104. The bill was vague, the appellate court held, “not in the sense that it imprecisely distinguishes between permissible and impermissible conduct, but because no standard of permissible conduct is specified at all.” App.Op.¶102.

The Fourth District held that the trial court’s third rationale for granting a permanent injunction was moot. App.Op.¶112. The trial court had concluded that the feral-swine laws were overbroad because they criminalized the possession of “all pigs, hogs, and swine in Ohio.” App.Op.¶52. Following that decision, the General Assembly amended the definition of feral swine found in R.C. 1531.01(HHH). That amendment, the Fourth District held, mooted the trial court’s third reason for concluding that Ohio’s feral-swine laws were unconstitutional. *See* App.Op.¶112.

**THIS CASE PRESENTS A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION  
OF PUBLIC AND GREAT GENERAL INTEREST**

This case involves a permanent, state-wide injunction in which the Fourth District effectively declared the State’s duly enacted laws void and unenforceable. That alone makes this case one of public and great general interest.

The *reasons* the Fourth District gave for its decision call for the Court’s attention as well. The appellate court broke new constitutional ground when it held that a court may enjoin a law on the basis that it fails to provide compensation for an alleged taking. And it dramatically expanded the constitutional void-for-vagueness doctrine when it enjoined the feral-swine laws—despite the fact that the requirements of those laws are undisputably clear. The Fourth District’s misapplication of these constitutional doctrines presents two independent, and substantial, constitutional questions.

**I. A state-wide injunction prohibiting the enforcement of a duly enacted law is inherently a substantial constitutional question of public and great general interest.**

The Court has recently emphasized that the State has “a sovereign interest in passing and enforcing [its] duly enacted laws, and a court’s order enjoining the operation of such laws causes irreparable injury to that sovereign interest.” *Doe v. Columbus*, 2026-Ohio-1095, ¶2. The Fourth District trampled on that interest. If allowed to stand, the votes of three members of the Fourth District Court of Appeals will have overridden the votes of 121 members of the General Assembly. The Fourth District may have been unanimous in enjoining Ohio’s feral-swine laws, but the General Assembly was unanimous in *adopting* those laws. *See* House Bill 503 Votes, Ohio General Assembly, available at <https://perma.cc/X74G-MFWJ>.

The broad scope of the Fourth District’s decision exacerbates the sovereign injury that its decision has caused. Rather than enjoin specific statutes or statutory provisions, the Fourth District purported to enjoin a *bill*. It declared that the trial court properly granted a permanent injunction because “H.B. 503 constituted an unconstitutional taking,” App.Op.¶109, and because “H.B. 503 violated Due Process because it was unconstitutionally vague,” App.Op.¶104. But courts review laws, not bills. A “court’s function in reviewing legislative enactments is limited to interpreting the meaning of statutory provisions and determining whether they are in accord with the federal and state Constitutions.” *City of Toledo v. State*, 2018-Ohio-2358, ¶31. In purporting to enjoin an entire bill, the Fourth District’s decision conflicts with the First District’s approach. That court has properly recognized that courts may issue

injunctions only on a statute-by-statute basis. *See Preterm-Cleveland v. Yost*, 2026-Ohio-23, ¶41 (1st Dist.).

## **II. The Fourth District’s takings holding upends takings law, conflicts with this Court’s precedent, and creates uncertainty for future cases.**

The Ohio and United States Constitutions do not categorically prohibit the taking of private property for a public purpose. They prohibit the taking of private property “*without just compensation*.” U.S. Const. Amend. V (emphasis added); *see also* Ohio Const. Art. I, §19. As the constitutional language indicates, the Takings Clause “does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power.” *First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of Los Angeles*, 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987) (collecting cases). “As long as an adequate provision for obtaining just compensation exists, there is no basis to enjoin the government’s action effecting a taking.” *Knick v. Twp. of Scott*, 588 U.S. 180, 201 (2019).

Ohio law provides a way to obtain compensation. As the Court has repeatedly made clear, a party may file a mandamus action to “compel public authorities to institute appropriation proceedings where an involuntary taking of private property is alleged.” *State ex rel. Preschool Dev., Ltd. v. City of Springboro*, 2003-Ohio-3999, ¶12 (quoting *State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts.*, 95 Ohio St.3d 59, 63 (2002)).

The Fourth District disregarded these settled constitutional principles when it enjoined Ohio’s feral-swine laws on the basis that they “constitute[] an unconstitutional taking of [Shawnee Ridge’s] property.” App.Op.¶109. If the Fourth District believed that an uncompensated taking had occurred, then what it *should* have done is instruct Shawnee Ridge to file a mandamus action seeking compensation. *See City*

of *Springboro*, 2003-Ohio-3999 at ¶12. What it did instead was enjoin the General Assembly’s valid exercise of its constitutional power. App.Op.¶109. An injunction was no more appropriate than if the Fourth District enjoined the construction of a road instead of instructing an affected landowner to seek compensation by way of mandamus. The Takings Clause’s compensation requirement provides no basis to enjoin road construction. It provides no basis to enjoin Ohio’s feral-swine laws either.

The road analogy shows why this case involves more than mere error correction. Ohio courts agree that mandamus is the appropriate vehicle for obtaining compensation when private property is taken. *See, e.g., Gavriloff v. City of Kent*, 2007-Ohio-6741, ¶¶42–43 (11th Dist.). The Fourth District’s decision conflicts with that settled precedent. It does more than that, however. By opening the door to injunctions and not compensation, the Fourth District has laid the foundation for additional conflicts. The Court should not wait for a new type of conflict to arise. It should act now. Waiting will merely delay a future case in which a court *properly* applies the law.

### **III. The Fourth District’s vagueness holding dramatically expands the void-for-vagueness doctrine.**

The Fourth District’s other constitutional holding is equally aberrant—and equally worthy of review. As an alternative holding, the Fourth District held that Ohio’s feral-swine laws violated Shawnee Ridge’s due process rights as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. *See* App.Op.¶¶97, 102. The feral-swine laws, it held, were unconstitutionally vague because they failed to specify a “standard of permissible conduct.” App.Op.¶102. There are at least two problems with the Fourth District’s due-process holding.

*First*, as explained more below, it is wrong. The Fourth District reached the conclusion it did only by ignoring significant portions of the feral-swine laws—and by taking others out of context. The Fourth District’s approach to statutory interpretation conflicts with this Court’s precedent. The Court has held that in “ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, [a] court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.” *State v. Turner*, 2020-Ohio-6773, ¶18 (quotation omitted). The Fourth District did not do so.

*Second*, the Fourth District’s decision improperly waters down the constitutional void-for-vagueness standard. The Fourth District did not conclude that the feral-swine laws failed to establish a discernable standard of conduct. It in fact did the opposite; it wrote that the portion of Shawnee Ridge’s business operations involving wild boar “went from lawful to criminal” after the laws adopted in H.B. 503 took effect. *See App.Op.* ¶99. This Court has made clear, however, that a statute “will not be struck down as unconstitutionally vague if the challenger’s conduct clearly falls within the activities proscribed by the statute.” *City of Huron v. Kisil*, 2025-Ohio-2921, ¶1. And if the feral-swine laws so clearly apply to Shawnee Ridge’s operations so as to render them unlawful, then there was no basis to enjoin them as vague.

The Fourth District usurped the General Assembly’s constitutional authority by enjoining the feral-swine laws even though the requirements of those laws are clear. The judicial role “is not the legislative role,” and courts “must be careful that we do not under the guise of judicial review substitute [their] policy preferences for those of the legislature.” *State v. Grevious*, 2022-Ohio-4361, ¶53 (DeWine, J., concurring).

Reviewing the Fourth District’s decision will provide more than just an opportunity to correct the lower court’s flawed constitutional holding. It will also provide an opportunity for the Court to clarify its own vagueness precedent. That precedent has been the source of some confusion and criticism. *See In re D.S.*, 2017-Ohio-8289, ¶¶38–49 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); *cf. also Johnson v. United States*, 576 U.S. 591, 607–08 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the “vagueness doctrine shares an uncomfortably similar history with substantive due process”). This case provides the Court an opportunity to address that confusion as well.

## ARGUMENT

### **Appellant’s Proposition of Law 1:**

*The sole remedy for an alleged uncompensated taking is a mandamus action to compel appropriation and compensation; a court may not preemptively enjoin a statute for purportedly taking personal property without compensation.*

This Court has repeatedly made clear that “[m]andamus is the appropriate action to compel public authorities to institute appropriation proceedings where an involuntary taking of private property is alleged.” *State ex rel. Preschool Dev., Ltd. v. City of Springboro*, 2003-Ohio-3999, ¶12 (quoting *State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts.*, 95 Ohio St.3d 59, 63 (2002)). The Fourth District nevertheless held that the feral-swine laws were unconstitutional because the laws do not *themselves* provide a “system for compensation.” App.Op.¶108. That was wrong.

The Takings Clause “does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power.” *First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. Of Los Angeles*, 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987). “[C]onstitutional concerns do not arise” under the Takings Clause when property owners have “ways to seek just

compensation.” *DeVillier v. Texas*, 601 U.S. 285, 292 (2024). “[I]n the event of a taking,” compensation is the remedy “required by the Constitution.” *First English*, 482 U.S. at 316; *see also Knick v. Twp. of Scott*, 588 U.S. 180, 193 (2019). “As long as an adequate provision for obtaining just compensation exists, there is no basis to enjoin the government’s action effecting a taking.” *Knick*, 588 U.S. at 201.

The Fourth District’s decision conflicts with these controlling precedents. By facially enjoining Ohio’s feral-swine laws, the Fourth District did precisely what *Knick* said courts *should not* do. That alone should resolve this case. The Court need not decide whether a taking occurred in this case—it need only confirm what precedent makes clear: Shawnee Ridge should have pursued relief for its uncompensated-taking claim by way of mandamus, *not* declaratory relief and an injunction.

The Fourth District justified its decision by citing *State ex rel. Gilmour Realty, Inc. v. City of Mayfield Heights*, 2008-Ohio-3181 for the principle that “a mandamus action to compel appropriation proceedings and an action for declaratory and injunctive relief are not mutually exclusive proceedings.” App.Op.¶105. *Mayfield Heights* held just the opposite. It held that the declaratory judgment action in that case *did not* constitute an adequate remedy at law because “mandamus is the appropriate action to compel public authorities to institute appropriation proceedings,” and because the pending declaratory judgment action in that case could not compel “an appropriation proceeding for the property allegedly taken” and therefore did not provide a complete remedy. *Mayfield Heights*, 2008-Ohio-3181 at ¶¶12–14. *Mayfield Heights* shows why the Fourth District was wrong, not why it was right.

To be sure, parites may seek an injunction in “those rare instances” where they seek to challenge “the preliminary issues of the right to take and the necessity for the take.” *See City of Norwood v. Horney*, 2006-Ohio-3799, ¶¶110, 113. This case does not involve one of those instances, however. The Fourth District enjoined the feral-swine laws because those laws “provide[] no system for compensation,” *not* because the laws were an improper exercise of state authority. App.Op.¶108. Shawnee Ridge’s Complaint cannot be construed as challenging those preliminary issues either. The words “necessity” and “right to take” appear nowhere in that document.

Even if Shawnee Ridge *had* challenged those issues, they are not before the Court now because the trial court never held a necessity hearing. The hearing that the trial court *did* hold was no substitute—and was itself flawed. Among other things, the trial court prevented the State from introducing evidence addressing the relationship between feral swine and hunting preserves by improperly converting a preliminary hearing to a permanent one over the State’s objection. *See* App.Op.¶84.

**Appellant’s Proposition of Law 2:**

*Because people of ordinary intelligence can determine what Ohio’s feral-swine laws prohibit, those laws are not unconstitutionally vague; alleged difficulties in complying with a law do not render those laws unconstitutionally vague.*

The Fourth District’s vagueness holding is just as flawed as its takings holding. There too, it misapplied the relevant law. “The void-for-vagueness doctrine does not require statutes to be drafted with scientific precision.” *Perez v. Cleveland*, 78 Ohio St.3d 376, 378 (1997). It requires only that “a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory

enforcement.” *State v. Hacker*, 2023-Ohio-2535, ¶30 (quotation omitted). Even when a statute is ambiguous, courts must indulge “every reasonable interpretation in favor of finding the statute constitutional.” *Perez*, 78 Ohio St. 3d at 379.

The feral-swine laws easily clear that bar. An ordinary person would have no trouble understanding what those laws require. As is relevant here, there can be no doubt that Shawnee Ridge may not “knowingly release for hunting or hunt wild boar or feral swine” on its property. R.C. 1533.731(B)(4). Nor may it “[p]rofit from the releasing, hunting, trapping, or killing of wild boar or feral swine.” R.C. 1533.75. These statutory prohibitions are unambiguous and a person of ordinary intelligence would be able to easily determine what R.C. 1533.731 and .75 do and do not permit.

Even the Fourth District implicitly acknowledged that the feral-swine laws are clear. It noted that the portion of Shawnee Ridge’s business operations that involved hunting wild boar “went from lawful to criminal” after the feral-swine laws took effect. *See App.Op.*¶99. But if it was clear to the Fourth District that the feral-swine laws prohibited a portion of Shawnee Ridge’s operations, then those laws cannot be said to be unconstitutionally vague. *City of Huron v. Kisil*, 2025-Ohio-2921, ¶15.

The Fourth District enjoined the feral-swine laws not because the laws were unclear, but because it concluded that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for Shawnee Ridge to comply with them. The Fourth District wrote that, after the laws’ effective date, Shawnee Ridge “could not possess, feed, not feed, hunt, kill, transport, or profit from the hunting or killing” of the wild boar on its property. *See App.Op.*¶99.

That conclusion was based on a misreading of the relevant statutes. Despite the Fourth District’s characterization of the law, Shawnee Ridge is *not* prohibited from killing the wild boar on its property. Under R.C. 1533.75(A)(4), Shawnee Ridge cannot kill the boar “*except as otherwise provided in [R.C. 1533.751].*” And under R.C. 1533.751, Shawnee Ridge is permitted to “immediately eradicate ... feral swine without a hunting license.” The feral-swine laws, in other words, explicitly *permit* Shawnee Ridge to kill the wild boar currently located on its property.

Shawnee Ridge is likely to respond that a separate statute, R.C. 1533.731(B)(4), lacks the exception found in R.C. 1533.75(A)(4), and it is *that* statute that prevents it from killing the wild boar on its property. That argument ignores that the statutes use different language; one speaks of hunting, *see* R.C. 1533.731(B)(4), the other eradication, *see* R.C. 1533.751(B). And it ignores the Court’s precedent. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that when interpreting “related and co-existing statutes,” courts must “harmonize and give full application to all such statutes unless they are irreconcilable and in hopeless conflict.” *Everhart v. Coshocton Cnty. Mem’l Hosp.*, 2023-Ohio-4670, ¶19 (quotation omitted). Shawnee Ridge’s argument does the opposite; it puts a thumb on the scale in favor of conflict, not harmony.

Even if the feral-swine laws were written differently, Shawnee Ridge knew how to comply with them. It had ninety days to do so before the laws took effect. That did not matter, the Fourth District held, because “the State submitted no evidence” that Shawnee Ridge could have come into compliance with the feral-swine laws after H.B. 503 was enrolled but before the new statutes took effect. App.Op.¶101. But

whether a law is unconstitutionally vague is a *legal* question not an *evidentiary* one. *Cf. State v. Grevious*, 2022-Ohio-4361, ¶¶56–59 (DeWine, J., concurring in judgment).

Putting the Fourth District’s many other errors aside, the lower court still erred by upholding the trial court’s facial, state-wide permanent injunction. A finding of facial unconstitutionality requires a showing that the law is “is in direct conflict with inhibitions of the Constitution.” *Ohio Pub. Interest Action Group, Inc.*, 43 Ohio St.2d 175, syl.¶4 (1975). A party “cannot mount a successful void-for-vagueness challenge if his conduct clearly falls within the activities proscribed by the law.” *Huron*, 2025-Ohio-2921 at ¶15. To do otherwise would effectively allow a party “to mount an as-applied challenge to the statute on behalf of other, hypothetical parties.” *Id.* at ¶14. That, however, is what Shawnee Ridge seeks to do.

Finally, the Fourth District’s reasoning does not support the sweeping scope of relief granted to Shawnee Ridge. The only problem with the feral-swine laws that the Fourth District identified was that the laws do not address what Shawnee Ridge can do with the existing feral swine on its property. *See App.Op.*¶99. But the Fourth District never explained why, if that was the problem, it was necessary to enjoin *other* statutory provisions, like the prohibition on profiting from the “releasing, hunting, trapping, or killing of wild boar or feral swine.” *See R.C. 1533.75(A)(5); cf. also Johnson v. United States*, 576 U.S. 591, 615 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).

## CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should accept jurisdiction and reverse the Fourth District’s decision.

Respectfully submitted,

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## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction of was served on May 4, 2026, by e-mail on the following:

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